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THE WAR OF THE AIRWAVES IN PORTUGAL: 





This article focuses on the start of the ‘‘war of the airwaves’’ in Portugal. It 
provides data on the first foreign shortwave broadcasts in Portuguese, 
describing the background to those initial broadcasts and also analyzing their 
impact on Portuguese public opinion, as well as the degree of importance 
afforded such broadcasts by the Allies and the Axis Powers during World War 
II. Moreover, the article also details some of the strategies used by the warring 
nations to influence the editorial line of Portuguese radio stations. 
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The “war of the airwaves", which peaked during the first half of the 1940s when 
the propaganda and counter-propaganda strategies of the Axis and Allied 
powers reached full throttle, first appeared in Portugal before the outbreak of 
World War II. Interest in influencing Portuguese public opinion led a number of 
countries to seek out special relations with Portuguese radio stations and to 
produce shortwave broadcasts that could be listened to throughout the country, 
under the rule of an authoritarian regime – the Estado Novo (New State) led by 
Oliveira Salazar - since 1933. 
 
On the political front, the Estado Novo was a single-party regime with the União 
Nacional party holding the monopoly on political activity. As Braga da Cruz 
states, the period of construction of the Estado Novo was marked “by the 
evident authoritarianism of the State, by political and socio-economic orientated 
leadership, administrative and police repression and by political control on the 
movement of workers and political opposition.”1 Even so, this type of 
authoritarianism was different to all others since Oliveira Salazar did not see the 
State as an omnipotent entity. The arrangement was that the State’s power 
should be limited by Catholic morals, without which it would transform into a 
regime similar to Nazism which was deemed by Portugal’s Head of Government 
to be permeated with an “aggressive, excessive, hateful nationalism”.2 
 
The Constitution approved in 1933 established a series of rights including the 
freedom of expression, but in practice individual rights were very limited and 
censorship was one of the regime’s pillars. Censorship was managed by the 
military from the beginning and it prevented a large share of the news from 
reaching the public. Texts that were totally or partially censored in the press had 
to be replaced since the publication of pages with blank spaces was not 
allowed. The public was to remain unaware of the quantity of news that was 
being suppressed. Between 1932 and 1936 the opposition press was totally 
silenced and the daily censorship routine was established.3 
 
During the initial period of Salazar’s rule, radio broadcasting was not a main 
concern for the regime. In addition to the small number of receivers in the 
country, radio stations were mainly amateur and reached a very limited number 
of people.4 For this reason, censorship of broadcasting only became law in April 
1936. The radio landscape was then dominated by two main stations: the State-
run Emissora Nacional and privately owned Rádio Clube Português. All the 
information broadcast by State radio was controlled and this was tightened up 
after the outbreak of World War II. All international news had to be authorised 
for broadcast by the station’s chairman. On the other hand, besides the internal 
censorship operating inside the station, the main news sources used by State 
radio were news agencies whose telegrams were also subject to censorship.  
 
In Rádio Clube Português the control of information was also guaranteed a 
priori since the station was controlled by the Botelho Moniz family, a supporter 
of the regime. Rádio Clube Português played a decisive news role during the 
Spanish Civil War, taking the side of the nationalist forces led by General 
Franco against the Spanish Republic (Ribeiro: 2008).  
 
By the start of World War II, the only other station to broadcast news, besides 
Rádio Clube Português and Emissora Nacional, was the Church-owned Rádio 
Renascença. The news bulletins of that station were a summary of the news 
reported in the newspapers since the station did not have its own reporters. All 
the other smaller stations were forbidden from broadcasting news bulletins5 and 
all texts read during programmes that could be considered news had to be 
authorised in advance by the station’s censor. A censor on the station staff 
became mandatory following a decree law published on 21 September 1939. In 
fact, the regime took advantage of the outbreak of World War II to exercise 
greater control over the radio stations. The new legislation limited private 
broadcasting to those stations holding special authorisation from the 
Government, and compelled such stations to “bear the costs of having a 
Government inspector permanently on their premises.”6 Moreover, the smaller 
stations that operated in the regions of Lisbon and Porto were forced to share 
the same frequency, dividing the broadcasting schedule among them.  
 
This media landscape paved the way for foreign broadcasts to achieve 
widespread recognition in Portugal. If it had not been for Salazar’s censorship-
based media policies the public could have relied on news aired by the local 
stations or published in the local press. However, since both newspapers and 
radio stations only reported the news permitted by the censors, a thirst for more 
news was created and that could only be satisfied by listening to foreign 
stations. The BBC was “by far the most popular”7 of all those broadcasting to 
Portugal, as will be detailed below.  
 
The First Foreign Broadcasts 
 
The Soviet Union had been the first country to broadcast in foreign languages 
and it was also the first to broadcast in Portuguese. Lenin swiftly understood the 
importance that radio could acquire as a means of internal and external 
propaganda. He fervently promoted the development of broadcasting through 
the creation of a radio laboratory that started experimental broadcasts in 1919 
(Wasburn, 1992: 3).  
 
A decade later, a department for foreign languages was created within the 
Soviet broadcasting system and Radio Moscow was formally inaugurated in 
October 1929. By the end of that year the foreign section of Radio Moscow 
aired programmes in French, English and German and broadcasts in those 
languages became daily during 1930. “Within three years, regular broadcasts in 
Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish had been added, along with 
occasional programmes in Turkish and Portuguese” (Wasburn, 1992: 5). 
 
There is not much evidence to demonstrate how Radio Moscow was received in 
Portugal at the time. Its popularity was not noticeable for several reasons. 
Firstly, broadcasts were occasional and did not create listening habits. 
Secondly, Soviet foreign broadcasts did not generally “take account of different 
national and cultural conditions and ways of life” (Whitton, 1942: 6). They were 
dedicated to spreading the Bolshevist ideology, which made them mostly of 
interest to those who supported communism which  had been identified by 
Salazar as the main threat to humanity. Moreover, after the political police 
imprisoned the main communist leaders in Portugal in 1935, the Communist 
Party would remain poorly organised up to the beginning of the 1940s (Pereira, 
1999: 145-146).  
 
To support the idea that broadcasts from Moscow played no important role in 
Portugal at the time, the official history of the Portuguese Communist Party 
does not make any mention of any significant role for Radio Moscow during the 
1930s. Furthermore, during the early 1930s the number of radio receivers in 
Portugal was so small that no station could have had many regular listeners. In 
1933, when the first news bulletins in Portuguese were broadcast,8 only 15,973 
receivers were legally registered in the entire country (Ribeiro, 2005: 140). Even 
so, in the months that preceded the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, which 
was a period when the Estado Novo shifted to a more reactionary phase, the 
political police issued a warning that Radio Moscow was broadcasting in 
Portuguese once a week, on Thursdays at 10:30 pm.9 The broadcasts were 
directed through shortwave transmitters and also reached the African colonies. 
 
The Start of Broadcasts by the Axis Powers 
 
Broadcasting would also play a particularly important role in Germany in the 
internal and external championing of the new regime, just as it had in the Soviet 
Union. Following Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, Goebbels set up a gigantic 
propaganda structure aimed at cultivating confidence in the National-Socialist 
regime and cementing its recognition in the international arena. The Olympic 
Games of 1936 were used, considering the need for international recognition, 
as a means of showing the world the supremacy of the Aryan race and the 
German system of organisation. The heavy investment made in the Games 
included them being broadcast on radio. “During the 16 days of the Olympic 
Games 2500 reports were broadcast in 28 languages” (Zeman, 1964: 110), 
including Portuguese. It was an incredible vehicle for propaganda, particularly 
since it was the first time arrangements had been made for the simultaneous 
reporting of the Games. 
 
The shortwave system, which was used “to supplement the reports of foreign 
broadcasters and to enlighten those countries who did not send their own 
reporters” (Zeman, 1964: 111), was a success for the National Socialists who 
received messages of praise from several foreign radio representatives. 
Furthermore, the Portuguese considered the reporting work of the Germans to 
be proof of German superiority in radio broadcasting. The 20 June edition of the 
Rádio Semanal (a weekly publication specialising in medium and shortwave 
broadcasts) did not hold back in its praise for the previously unknown capacity 
of German radio to broadcast the Games to almost the entire planet.10 
 
Besides being the country that invested most in broadcasts in Portuguese 
during the 1930s, Germany was the most interested of all the major powers in 
developing regular contact with the State-run Emissora Nacional station. The 
Germans clearly dominated this period of propaganda, with a reach that 
extended beyond radio to include other cultural activities. Throughout the 
1930s, the German diplomatic representation invested in the production of 
literature for different types of target public. The main target public was “military 
personnel and the forces of public order, those connected to universities and 
technical fields, and those working in the tax field. Journalists and artists were 
also targeted, but the Germans’ had less success since those groups 
predominantly supported the English” (Telo, 1989: 14). Moreover, employees of 
the Emissora Nacional and the National Propaganda Secretariat (SPN) visited 
Germany and staff of the German radio station also made visits to Lisbon 
(Ribeiro, 2005: 201-203). Fernando Pessa, one of the first presenters of 
Portugal’s official radio station, was invited to visit the Reichs Rundfunk 
Gesellschaft (RRG) in 1938, after having receiving training in the Latin-
American section of the BBC in February and March of that year. He later 
related that he was very impressed with German radio’s organisation.11  
 
German shortwave broadcasts in Portuguese started in 1936 and were the first 
to have any impact on Portugal. The actual impact was, however, limited to a 
restricted group of people since the number of people owning radio sets at the 
time was still very small. Nevertheless, the German broadcasts in Portuguese 
were reported in the press and they received considerable attention from radio 
enthusiasts. Following the end of the Berlin Games, the transmission of news 
bulletins in Portuguese resumed in 1937 (Balfour, 1979: 37). Besides reaching 
the African colonies, the broadcasts could also be tuned into mainland Portugal. 
The same was true for the broadcasts transmitted to Brazil. It is, however, 
difficult to accurately know if reception conditions were satisfactory since all 
historical sources, particularly the Estado Novo’s official archives and 
newspapers published at the time, only began to focus on the broadcasts from 
Berlin in the months preceding the outbreak of war. By the beginning of 1939, 
the schedules for shortwave broadcasts published in Rádio Semanal mentioned 
a daily news bulletin aired during the evening that could be listened to in 
Portugal.12 On a number of occasions, the British Ambassador in Lisbon 
expressed his concern regarding this bulletin and the impact it could have on 
influencing the Portuguese public opinion. 
 
As the “phoney” war was coming to an end and Hitler was preparing his attack 
on Britain, the Germans started to advertise their broadcasts to Portugal in the 
main national newspapers13 as well as in the German propaganda magazine, A 
Esfera. Investment in broadcasts also rose sharply during this period. There 
were two news bulletins of fifteen minutes each at the beginning of August 
1940, at 6:45 pm and 9:45 pm. A few weeks later the service had already 
grown to four news bulletins (also of fifteen minutes) at 6:45 pm, 9:45 pm, 
midnight and 2:00 am and two programmes on current affairs at 11:30 pm and 
2:15 am.14 Later in that year, in December, the broadcasting hours were much 
improved for both news (5:45 pm, 7:32 pm, 8:45 pm, 11 pm and 1 am) and 
programmes (9:30 pm, 10:30 pm and 1:15 am).15 This shift in schedule allowed 
German radio to broadcast two news bulletins and one programme during the 
peak radio listening hours of that time.  
 
The Axis powers’ shortwave broadcasts to Portugal were not limited to those 
produced by the RRG. The Italians had been broadcasting a news bulletin in 
Portuguese since January 1938. Radio Roma, which was devised for broadcast 
to Latin America, had a nightly programming schedule that included a news 
bulletin in Portuguese. The broadcasting time frequently oscillated between 11 
pm and 12:30 am. Despite the increase of the number of bulletins in Portuguese 
during the war, the number of listeners was low and would remain so 
throughout the war. The same was true for the two broadcasts in Portuguese 
made by the Vichy government during the period of Nazi occupation.16  
 
The British Response 
 
The British response to the German and Italian broadcasts in Portuguese was 
very effective. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the BBC broadcasts to 
Portugal appeared much later than those of the Axis powers. Although the BBC 
Empire Service was one of the first in the world to produce regular broadcasts 
aimed abroad, the usage of radio broadcasting in foreign languages for 
propaganda purposes was considered to be something that only dictatorships 
did and not democratic regimes, due to the derogatory meaning that the 
concept of “propaganda” had acquired following the First World War. This fact 
explains why an ongoing debate on the nature of the concept of propaganda 
took place within the BBC during the second half of the 1930s and the first year 
of the Second World War. This discussion set those who believed propaganda 
to be beneficial against those who considered it to solely and exclusively 
produce negative results (Briggs, 1970: 177). Moreover, the heavy investment 
in propaganda, particularly radio propaganda, by the Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini 
dictatorships generated a direct association in people’s minds between 
“dictatorship” and “propaganda”. 
 
The association of these two concepts explains why the BBC only started to 
broadcast in a foreign language in January 1938, beginning with its Arabic 
Service. This Service was created to counterattack Radio Bari (Winston, 2005: 
286), a station operated by the Italians that, besides promoting the fascist 
ideology, frequently reported events that had not taken place. Such a strategy 
was based on Goebbels’ philosophy, where the fact that the information was 
true or false was totally inconsequential provided that the lie could not be 
exposed. According to the Propaganda Minister of the Third Reich, “the policy 
of the news ... is a weapon of war; its purpose is to wage war and not to give 
out information” (Doob, 1985: 139). 
 
The BBC, on the other hand, advertised itself as opposing policies such as the 
airing of false news. Furthermore, contrary to its rival stations, the BBC had to 
deal with a funding shortage, which meant that each language service it 
established “involved discussion on a supplementary budget” with the Foreign 
Office (Briggs,. 1970: 177).17 The first broadcasts in Spanish and Portuguese 
began in March 1938, following one such discussion. Those broadcasts were 
directed towards Latin America with the goal of attacking the anti-British 
propaganda that was being disseminated in the region at that time by the 
Germans. Nonetheless, of the three hours of programmes broadcast to Latin 
America only the news bulletins were in the local languages - all the talks and 
discussions were aired in English (Whitton, 1942: 34). 
 
Later on, Chamberlain’s speech during the Munich  crisis was broadcast on 27 
September 1938 in French, German and Italian (Salt, 1942: 39). “The BBC, for 
the first time, directly addressed Germans and Italians” (Whitton, 1942: 40) and, 
from then onwards, broadcasts to Europe were a regular occurrence as the 
Corporation finally established its European Service. Nevertheless, despite the 
multiple foreign services that were created in the months that preceded the 
beginning of World War II, the BBC had to deal with a lack of transmitters and 
also a lack of qualified staff to work on the foreign broadcasts, in particular 
“English switch censors who could understand foreign languages and English 
sub-editors” (Briggs, 1970: 177). Despite the issues that were raised inside the 
BBC, the range of countries covered by the broadcasts rose from six to fourteen 
during 1939, including Portugal and Spain, with the aim being to counterattack 
the German RRG. In actual fact, shortwave broadcasts to the Iberian Peninsula 
only began on 4 June 1939. 
 
In the months preceding the start up of those broadcasts, the creation of the 
new service was the focus of attention of both the British and Portuguese 
authorities for different reasons. The Ambassador in Lisbon, Sir Walford Selby, 
was aware of the effective work that the Germans were doing on the 
propaganda front in Portugal and issued several alerts regarding the low profile 
of the work being carried out by the British in this field. At the end of 1938, he 
requested that the Foreign Office put pressure on the BBC to broadcast, at the 
very least, a regular news bulletin to Portugal.  
 
The situation in Portugal is fittingly described by Asa Briggs’ statement referring 
to other regions, “it was from the Empire not from Westminster that the first 
cries of alarm about the deficiencies of the British propaganda were heard” 
(Briggs, 1970: 7). Before the matter became a concern in London it already 
existed in the Lisbon Embassy and in other British embassies throughout 
Europe. 
 
Influencing Portuguese public opinion was a critical area of focus for all foreign 
propaganda services operating in Portugal. On the British side, besides 
counterattacking German propaganda, getting the message across to the 
Portuguese public was particularly important for two very important reasons. 
First of all, the Estado Novo seemed to be ideologically closer to the continental 
authoritarian regimes, a fact that made it possible for some sections of the 
Portuguese elite to advocate a closer relationship with Germany. On the other 
hand, London was well aware of Franco’s proposal to Salazar to sign a Treaty 
of Non-Aggression. This proposal, which was submitted in September 1938 to 
the Head of the Portuguese Government, was very well received by the British 
authorities. Besides establishing that no attack should be launched against 
Spain from Portuguese territory and vice-versa, the proposed text also 
mentioned Franco’s intention of remaining neutral if a war in Europe were to 
take place (Telo, 1987: 35). 
 
Salazar’s delay in answering that proposal led the British Government to 
question the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Armindo Monteiro, on the 
subject and to put a certain degree of pressure on Portugal to sign the deal, 
since it would guarantee a neutral Peninsula. It was only after the intervention 
by the Foreign Office in January 1939 that Salazar agreed to negotiate with 
Franco. That fact was a clear signal that Lisbon was giving “priority to the 
alliance with England” (Telo, 1998: 138). The official signing ceremony of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression took place on 17 March 1939, giving 
Portugal the role of “an intermediary between Spain and the western 
democracies” (Telo, 1998:10). 
 
Against that background, Sir Walford Selby considered broadcasts by the BBC 
to be essential for strengthening propaganda activities in Portugal. This issue 
was also on the agenda of the Foreign Office, which deemed the expansion of 
shortwave broadcasts to Portugal, as well as to other European countries, to be 
essential: 
  
His Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon has recently urged the 
B.B.C. should do broadcasts in Portuguese for Portugal. The 
Germans broadcast every evening extremely propagandist 
material and Sir Walford Selby thinks it would be of the greatest 
advantage if the B.B.C. could follow these German broadcasts in 
Portuguese with a news bulletin on our usual objective and 
accurate line.18  
 
For the British Government the need to compete with German transmissions 
was urgent, despite the fact that the RRG broadcasts were neither well known 
nor much appreciated in Portugal. Nevertheless, German propaganda 
supremacy in Lisbon had reached the London press, as pointed out by Armindo 
Monteiro in his correspondence with Salazar:  
  
The Foreign Office’s aim with the creation of this service is to 
counteract German propaganda in Portugal, which a number of 
newspapers here – such as the front page of today’s edition of the 
News Chronicle, for example – are reporting to be insistent, 
widespread and insidious. The B.B.C. shall adopt German 
methods, distributing programmes in Portugal of its broadcasts 
recorded in Portuguese. It seems that the same system is going to 
be used in Spain.19  
 
While the BBC was waiting for the arrival of transmitters that would enable 
broadcasts to more countries, the Foreign Office did not want to wait and was 
very interested in the possibility of “broadcasts in Portuguese for Portugal even 
before the new shortwave transmitters were available by the rearrangement of 
programmes”.20 This possible course of action was being analysed while the 
British Government was attentively monitoring Lisbon’s stance towards the 
Treaty proposal made by Franco. The issue of broadcasting to Portugal was 
discussed at the BBC Board meeting on 12 January, at which the Governors 
decided to inform the Foreign Office that they were ready to undertake the 
broadcasts as soon as the Government expressed its official interest in the 
service and made the financial arrangements considered necessary to support 
it.21  
 
Besides the internal problems which had to be solved before the launch of 
broadcasts to Portugal, the BBC was also concerned with the lack of shortwave 
receivers available in the country. This issue led Sir Noel Ashbridge, Controller 
of Engineering, to warn that the potential number of listeners that could be 
reached in Portugal was very low.22 The problem was on the agenda of Malcolm 
Frost, Director of the BBC’s Overseas Intelligence Department, who visited 
Lisbon during January 1939, discussing the matter with the staff of the British 
Embassy. Fearing that Frost might advise otherwise, Sir Walford dispatched a 
telegram to the Foreign Office in which he strongly advocated daily Portuguese 
news bulletin on shortwave as soon as possible. The Ambassador stated that it 
was considered to be high priority in Lisbon since the Germans were already 
transmitting a daily bulletin to Portugal, which aired from 8.45 pm to 9 pm.23  
 
Both the German and British interest in Portugal can only be explained by the 
nature of its political regime, its geographical location and by its relationship 
with Franco’s Spain. The number of wireless receivers was low compared to 
most European countries and if the number of potential listeners were indeed 
the only significant factor then broadcasts to Portugal would not have been 
considered priority. According to official figures, Portugal possessed a total of 
89,300 receivers in 1939, which meant an average of one set per 76 individuals. 
It is known that this number is not accurate since many individuals did not 
register their sets to avoid paying ownership tax. In any case, even taking into 
account the existence of a few thousand clandestine receivers, it is clear that 
the number of potential listeners was not as high as that of other countries since 
Portugal had the lowest number of radio sets in Western Europe with the sole 
exception of Luxembourg.24  
 
Therefore the swift investment made in the BBC Portuguese Service was 
politically motivated, a hypothesis backed by the fact that the British Embassy in 
Lisbon was very concerned that the Estado Novo might not support the British 
in the crisis situation that was becoming more inevitable and foreseeable as 
time progressed. Since the Portuguese press was under the absolute control of 
the official censor, receiving instructions directly from the Ministry of the Interior, 
“if the Portuguese Government were in the grip of its Germanophile elements, 
broadcasting would be the only means of reaching the Portuguese public.”25 
 
In February 1939, a committee appointed by Sir Walford Selby provided a 
written synthesis of the importance of British broadcasts to Portugal. The 
committee was composed of the Consul A.H.W. King; M. Cheke, Press Attaché 
to the Lisbon Embassy; S. G. West, Director of the British Institute; and Malcolm 
Frost, Director of the BBC’s Overseas Intelligence Department. The report 
analysed the political situation in Lisbon at the time, and it stated that it would 
be very easy for the press to become dominated by pro-German elements due 
to the limited amount of British news available in Portugal at the time. According 
to the report, only one newspaper received a barebone Reuters’ service, which 
made it very difficult for the Portuguese to learn British views. 
 
The committee considered a daily Portuguese news bulletin by the BBC to be 
highly desirable underlining that it “would be of special importance in the early 
days of a crisis when the position of Portugal might hang in the balance.”26 It 
therefore recommended that broadcasts should be preceded and accompanied 
by advertising in local papers so that they might reach as many listeners as 
possible from the outset.  
 
The preparations for the broadcasts started in March. The aim was to produce 
a daily fifteen minute news bulletin for broadcast at 10 pm, which seemed to be 
the best available time that did not coincide with transmissions in other 
European languages. The time slot was proposed by the committee appointed 
by Sir Walford Selby, which meant that it was also a suitable hour for those that 
would presumably listen in Portugal.  
 
The BBC broadcasts, despite their late start compared to those of the RRG, 
achieved widespread acceptance and a large audience right from the 
beginning. This fact was emphasized by Artur Agostinho, who worked as a 
presenter for a number of Lisbon stations during World War II: 
  
The BBC had a large audience. It had a great deal of impact. It 
was listened to a lot. As soon as the BBC had Fernando Pessa it 
was listened to more than ever. [...] The public was fundamentally 
pro-Allies. [...] German broadcasts never had a large audience 
and had, compared to the BBC, much less influence. [...] The 
BBC was deemed to be the “voice of truth”. [...] It had a great deal 
of credibility. [...] BBC meant “you can believe it” and the BBC’s 
impact was very different to that of the German broadcaster 
which, as a matter of fact, was hardly listened to in Portugal (Artur 
Agostinho, interview, 9 June 2006). 
 
The BBC’s investment in broadcasts to Portugal increased as the war 
progressed, as was also the case with the RRG. From September 1939 the 
BBC began to broadcast an information bulletin at lunchtime in addition to a 
news bulletin after dinnertime. Nonetheless, the growth of investment in 
broadcasts to Portugal was especially evident from 1941 when the Voice of 
London began to regularly broadcast talks and variety programmes besides the 
news. These new programmes began to form part of the lunchtime broadcasts 
from February of that year, and from 27 April they were also included in the 
night-time broadcasts.27 The space allocated in both cases was fifteen minutes 
immediately following the news bulletins. The number of broadcasts to Portugal 
was expanded later on to three, in May 1942, and four in October 1943.28 
 
In March 1943 the Portuguese Service underwent a major change. On 29 
March, the evening news bulletin was rescheduled to 9:45 pm while the 
programme that followed was taken off the air and replaced by a re-broadcast 
of programmes in Portuguese received from the United States.29 This led to 
protests from regular listeners as well as from the Ambassador Sir Ronald 
Campbell,30 who had replaced Sir Walford Selby in the Lisbon Embassy in 
December 1940. The matter was later discussed in Washington by Viscount 
Halifax.31 As a result, the American broadcasts were suspended in May.32 In the 
meantime, the USA had begun its own shortwave broadcasts to Portugal at the 
end of 1942.33 The Voice of America’s broadcasts never generated great 
interest and the number of listeners is estimated to have been quite low.34 
 
British and German Influence on Portuguese Radio Stations 
 
The “war of the airwaves” also encompassed local Portuguese radio stations 
besides shortwave broadcasts. In addition to the exchange of programmes 
between foreign stations and the Emissora Nacional, which primarily occurred 
during the initial years of the war, (Ribeiro, 2005: 292) both the Germans and 
the British tried to influence the editorial orientation of Portuguese stations. 
These attempts, however, proved to be almost impossible with the three largest 
Portuguese broadcasters that operated during the entire Estado Novo regime: 
Emissora Nacional, Rádio Clube Português and Rádio Renascença. While 
Emissora Nacional was state-funded, the other two stations were the only ones 
authorised to broadcast advertising. This fact made them less permeable to 
foreign influence since they had their own guaranteed source of revenue.  
 
The situation with regard to the smaller broadcasters was however very 
different - the financial difficulties they faced and the political orientation of their 
owners made them targets for the British and Germans, who offered subsidies 
in exchange for propaganda services. The stations most plagued in this regard 
were the member stations of the Emissores Associados de Lisboa [Lisbon 
Broadcasters Association], created as a result of the government decree of 
1939 that forced smaller radio stations in the Lisbon region to share the same 
frequency. The same decree was passed with respect to Porto, where the local 
stations were forced to club together to establish the Emissores do Norte 
Reunidos [North United Broadcasters] (Ribeiro, 2005: 224). 
 
The broadcasting of advertising by these radio station associations was 
forbidden, making their financial survival quite difficult and turning them into 
relatively easy targets for agents of foreign propaganda. Nonetheless, since all 
spoken content had to be approved by the censor in advance, music was the 
only way that the stations could show their allegiance with one of the warring 
sides:  
  
Advertising on the smaller stations was not permitted. So how did 
the Germans and the English carry out their war of information? 
Through music. As the stations were poor and had meagre record 
collections they were supplied with music records. The British 
Embassy provided Anglo-Saxon music and the German Legation 
provided German music. [...] Music was a means of influencing 
people (Artur Agostinho, interview, 9 June 2006). 
 
The British won the first “battle of music” since, similar to the situation with the 
press, the majority of those in charge of radio stations were pro-Allies. In fact, it 
was the British supremacy in conquering the support of the small radio stations 
that led the Germans to change their strategy. Since it was forbidden for 
foreigners to own radio stations, the Germans used front persons who acquired 
dominant positions in the small stations that belonged to Emissores Associados 
de Lisboa. The first broadcaster to fall under the direct influence of the Germans 
was Rádio Luso: this was the station where Artur Agostinho, who would later on 
become an announcer at Emissora Nacional, started his career: 
  
They ended up buying the broadcasters. Rádio Luso was sold to 
the Germans, not directly because that was forbidden, but 
through a puppet – a man called Vicente Alcântara, who was 
working in the cinema field. I was all for the English side and so I 
left. [...] The British wielded heavy influence in Clube Radiofónico 
de Portugal and in Rádio Peninsular. [...] Clube Radiofónico was 
[...] owned by the Staff of Lisbon Civil Hospitals and everyone was 
on the British and Allied side (Artur Agostinho, interview, 9 June 
2006). 
 
Besides Rádio Luso, the Germans also acquired a dominant position in Rádio 
Voz de Lisboa by means of a contract that was signed with the station during 
the early years of the war. Both stations aired many German songs in their 
regular programming.  
 
The British propaganda machine in Lisbon was, of course, uncomfortable with 
this situation. In 1943, following the favourable military developments for the 
Allies, the British managed to reverse the bond that existed between the owner 
of Rádio Voz de Lisboa and the Germans. Using an editor of the O Século 
newspaper, who was put in charge of broadcasts during 1943, the British 
managed to influence the editorial line of the station, which publicly presented 
its new programming strategy in September of that year. The station took on the 
mission of producing “Atlanticist” programmes; i.e. those which would serve the 
purpose of creating proximity between the nations that had an Atlantic 
shoreline. The broadcast that inaugurated this new programming strategy was 
widely advertised in the O Século newspaper and it was attended by 
representatives from Brazil and the USA. 35  
 
Following the alteration of its editorial line, the station requested official 
authorisation to change its name to Emissões Atlântico (Atlantic Broadcasts). 
The request was not granted and therefore the station started to present itself 
as “Rádio Voz de Lisboa – Emissões Atlântico”, which was subsequently 
considered to be an infringement of the law. As a consequence, the station was 
placed under the regime of “total censorship” for an entire month: 
  
Once the State had satisfactorily concluded that the “Voz de 
Lisboa” station had deliberately disobeyed prevailing orders, its 
programmes were placed under total advance censorship, from 
the introductory words to the closing piece. All content had to be 
submitted to and approved by the official censor at least 48 hours 
before airing. This imposition shall remain in place for a set period 
of time, long enough to assure us of the station’s good conduct.36 
 
Despite the problems that the station’s alignment with the Allies was causing, 
Rádio Voz de Lisboa continued to challenge the local authorities over the 
months that followed. In November, it organised a party to celebrate the 
inauguration of its new studios. Representatives of the countries “with an 
Atlantic Ocean shoreline” were invited.37 Furthermore, the station logo was an 
image of a caravel sailing in the Atlantic Ocean. Only four countries were 
identified on the logo, besides the name of the ocean: Portugal, Britain, United 
States and Brazil. Moreover, the station’s name had the words “Voz de Lisboa” 
in small letters and “Emissões Atlântico” in capital letters, a fact that was a clear 
contravention of the findings of Inspector Diogo Vaz Couceiro da Costa, who 
was in charge of the censorship of Emissores Associados de Lisboa.  
 
This blatant anglophile tendency of Rádio Voz de Lisboa led the authorities to 
take even greater control of the station’s broadcasts. The conflict became 
unsolvable and culminated in the transfer of the broadcasting rights of Rádio 
Voz de Lisboa to Rádio Peninsular, also a member of Emissores Associados de 
Lisboa.38 The latter station started to broadcast in two different time slots, 





The broadcasts by the Germans to Portugal were the first to have any 
significant impact, despite broadcasts from the Soviet Union being the first to 
reach Portugal. The Germans had a propaganda structure in Lisbon at the start 
of World War II that was far superior to that of Great Britain and the transborder 
broadcasts in Portuguese were no exception to the rule. Furthermore, German 
diplomacy in Portugal was able to exert influence on the music played by 
various radio stations in the Lisbon region, with the aim of disseminating interest 
for German music and culture. The Nazi propaganda structures were well 
implanted in Portugal at the time that discussions in London on the creation of 
the Ministry of Information were still ongoing. 
 
The Foreign Office only became interested in broadcasts by the BBC to 
Portugal when the Germans were broadcasting in Portuguese on a daily basis, 
a fact that greatly concerned the British Ambassador in Portugal. Nonetheless, 
the British response to the German head-start in radio propaganda would prove 
to be quite effective, partly fuelled by the lack of credibility of the broadcasts 
from Berlin which primarily focused on propaganda objectives. Moreover, the 
mainly pro-Allies sentiment that prevailed among the Portuguese public opinion 
allowed the Voice of London to become the most listened to station during the 
war and also led to various stations in the Lisbon region forging links with the 
British Embassy and British interests in Portugal.  
 
Portugal’s neutrality as well as its geographical location and its relations with 
neighbouring Spain made it a principal propaganda target for both the Allies and 
Axis powers. This propaganda reached its apex in the radio field, given that this 
was the communication means that reached the largest number of people and 
had a degree of influence that was considerably superior to the press or 
cinema. Radio was the media of choice because 52% of the population were 
illiterate (Candeias & Simões, 1999)39 and newspapers tended to arrive late 
outside the districts of Lisbon and Porto, due to the poor transport connections. 
Furthermore, films were only shown in a few cinemas in the major cities and all 
films had to be authorised by the censorship. Newsreels also had to be 
approved by the censor and they were frequently edited before being projected. 
Shortwave broadcasts on the other hand, besides reaching a larger number of 
people since the potential audience included the illiterate, were the only media 
not controlled by the local censorship apparatus, which explains the heavy 
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